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The religion which has no dogma is greater and more religious than 
one which rests upon the belief that in the end our ideals are fulfilled 
in the outer world.
1
  
  
 Summary 
 To the philosophers of religion, Bertrand Russell is known, above all, by his pamphlet, Why I 
am not a Christian.
2
 It is widely considered as, if not an atheistic text, an agnostic one. However, 
Russell also tried to “preserve religion without any dependence upon dogmas to which an intel-
lectually honest assent grows daily more difficult”.3 Thus, he developed an interesting project for 
religion without God and dogma. The first task of this paper is to reconstruct it. 
 Russell’s project of outlining a religion without God and dogma was severely criticized by his 
student Wittgenstein, who tried to radically improve it. This shows that the new “analytic philos-
ophers,” Russell and Wittgenstein, had a strong interest in religious problems, which, however, 
was poorly articulated by them and, correspondingly, poorly investigated by their interpreters. 
Unfortunately, the obscure expression of their religious impulses made the most influential phi-
losophy of the twentieth century—analytic philosophy—seem to be deprived of a world view. As 
a result, it was widely believed that the philosophies with a world view were existentialism, 
Marxism, or Thomism, but not analytic philosophy, and that analytic philosophy pretends to ex-
plain everything with scientific arguments.
4
 Another objective of this paper is to demonstrate that 
this belief is mistaken. 
 
Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s Unwritten Philosophy 
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 Conventional wisdom has it that Russell and Wittgenstein had radically different views 
about the role of logic and mystic contemplation in philosophy. Russell studied logic with the 
aim to advance a new philosophy method, while Wittgenstein sought to state with the help of 
logic what can be said, only to find out what can be shown: the mystical. And the latter was ex-
actly what was important to him. Thus, Wittgenstein wrote in his famous letter to Ludwig von 
Ficker in 1919:  
 
The book’s [Tractatus’s] point is an ethical one. ... My work consists of two parts: one pre-
sented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the im-
portant one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical, from inside as it were; and I 
am convinced that strictly, it can be limited only this way.
5
  
 
Unfortunately, Russell failed to understand Wittgenstein’s concept of the inexpressible.6 A clear 
sign of this is his judgment of Wittgenstein’s Principle of Showing in his “Introduction” to the 
Tractatus: “After all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said”.7 
  In this paper, I will show that Russell, too, had an unwritten philosophy of life: his philosophy 
of religion without God and dogma (to him, the belief in God and dogma were intrinsically con-
nected). Twice, in the years 1902–3, and again, in 1911–12, he tried to write it down but failed. 
What remained of these ventures were the essay, “A Free Man’s Worship” (1903), and the paper, 
“The Essence of Religion” (1912), which were published at the time. Another group of papers 
and notes on this subject were released posthumously. As a result, while Wittgenstein’s unwrit-
ten philosophy was openly discussed, only a small community of scholars tried to fix what Rus-
sell’s philosophy of religion really was.8 So much the worse for the scholars since the documents 
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show that Russell’s writings on this subject, some of which Wittgenstein was well acquainted 
with, clearly influenced Wittgenstein’s work on it.9 In this respect, as in many others, Wittgen-
stein was Russell’s diligent apprentice.10  
 In particular, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of life was based on Russell’s epistemology, accord-
ing to which there is a radical difference between the subject and the object of knowledge. The 
subject receives knowledge when s/he “grasps” the object. The act of grasping itself occurs in a 
relation of experience. Most importantly, the quality of experience is determined by the type of 
the relation between the subject and the object, and not by the object alone. Based on this under-
standing, Wittgenstein developed the conception that there are three different ways to experience 
the world sub-specie aeternitatis: logical, ethical, and aesthetic.
11
 That is why the same object can 
be known differently, e.g. in science and in art. If we see the single object sub-specie aeternita-
tis, “together with the space and time instead of in the space and time,” we see it as a work of 
art.
12
 But if we see the same object in its causal relations, we see it as an object of science, or 
practice. Wittgenstein illustrated this point with the example of the happy people and the unhap-
py people. They experience the same facts in the world, but in different ways, with different atti-
tudes.  
 In fact, this was Russell’s idea. He maintained that:  
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…the quality of infinity, which we feel, is not to be accounted for by the perception of new 
objects, other than those that at most times seen finite; it is to be accounted for, rather, by a 
different way of regarding the same object, a contemplation more impersonal, more vast, 
more filled with love than the fragmentary, disquiet consideration we give to things when we 
view them as means to help or hinder our own purposes.
13
  
 
 There are also clear pieces of evidence that Wittgenstein developed his philosophy of life as 
an attempt to improve Russell’s project. It is well documented that Wittgenstein read Russell’s 
“The Essence of Religion,” but found it disappointing. Wittgenstein saw Russell as “a traitor to 
the gospel of exactness [the two swore by, who] wantonly used words vaguely.”14 To achieve an 
exact philosophy of life, Wittgenstein adopted an idiosyncratic topology of persons, according to 
which there are three meanings of “subject”—empirical, metaphysical, and willing—who are 
separated by sharp boundaries.
15
 The metaphysical subject, in particular, does not lie on the 
plane of ideas (pictures) which the supposed empirical subject experiences, but it is its boundary. 
The conclusion Wittgenstein made was that the fear of death is a psychologically motivated pre-
disposition. It is not objectively grounded. 
  
Russell’s Two Projects for Truth-Searching 
 Next, I will argue that Russell’s explorations of human religious impulses have their counter-
parts in his investigations into epistemology and metaphysics, which, in turn, have their counter-
parts in his logical investigations. This means that the analysis of Russell’s religion without God 
and dogma can also shed light on his metaphysics and epistemology, and even on his logic; and 
vice versa.  
 Many authors correctly find the motives of Russell’s technical philosophy in his search for 
certain knowledge. In support of this claim, Russell’s statement that in his philosophical explora-
tions, “there [was] only one constant preoccupation: I have throughout been anxious to discover 
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how much we can be said to know and with what degree of certain knowledge or doubtfulness” 
is readily cited.
16
 Unfortunately, to this date, Russell’s search for certainty has been investigated 
almost exclusively in connection with his logical and epistemological studies.
17
 In fact, however, 
he developed two projects for truth-searching which run in parallel. On the one hand, there is a 
logical and an epistemological project; on the other, he adopted a “project to offer post-Christian 
religious consolation.”18 It was exactly so for Wittgenstein—the first, the logical project was 
incomparably better elaborated than the second, the religious one. At least in terms of projects, 
they were equally consistent and significant. 
 What is more, the two projects were intrinsically interdependent, so that the first shaped the 
second and vice versa. Moreover, there was mutual influence and mutual illumination between 
them. Nothing can better support this statement than a reference to the following facts. On Au-
gust 18, 1911, Russell prepared an outline for a book called “Prisons” (not to be confused with 
the manuscript “Prison” that he eventually produced19). In it, together with chapters on religious 
contemplation and union with the universe, chapters titled “The world of universals” and “The 
physical world” were included.20 But Russell also planned such a joint project on theoretical phi-
losophy and the philosophy of life two years later, in April 1913, while preparing the “Lowell 
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Lectures” that were to be delivered in Harvard in the spring of 1914.21 Its title was “The Search 
for Insight/Vision.” Later, Russell replaced it with another course of lectures that became known 
as Our Knowledge of the External World (1914).  
 Furthermore, Russell wrote The Problems of Philosophy
22
 together with the ethical and reli-
gious elaborations he made in “Prisons”. To be more exact, The Problems were composed be-
tween July 1 and August 20, 1911, while on July 24, 1911, Russell began to work on “Prisons.” 
He continued to write them between September 16 and 29 that year, and again, between Febru-
ary and March, 1912. Moreover, parts of “Prisons” were reprinted in the six closing paragraphs 
of the final chapters of The Problems of Philosophy. Furthermore, “The Perplexities of John For-
stice”23 was written in April–July 1912, while between January and May, 1912, Russell worked 
on his “Spiritual Autobiography,” which is now lost.24 Importantly enough, in exactly these 
months, he also worked—in intensive collaboration with Wittgenstein25—on his paper “On Mat-
ter,” on which I will speak later in this paper.  
 This, however, is not the whole story. “A Free Man’s Worship,” too, was produced at a time 
when Russell did the most difficult and, also, the most important work in theoretical philosophy. 
He started to write the essay in March–June 1902, continued to work on it in December, and fin-
ished it in January 1903. In parallel, Russell studied Meinong and Frege in May–June after com-
pleting The Principles of Mathematics in May 1902. In November that year, he completed the 
paper, “The Logical and Arithmetical Doctrines of Frege,” which was published as Appendix A 
of The Principles, the paper that contributed most to acquaint the academic world with Frege’s 
logic. Finally, in April 1903, Russell wrote “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assump-
tions”.26  
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 It is noteworthy that Russell’s later attempts to write on religious themes, in times when he 
was not closely engaged in the most complicated technical works, e.g. in What I Believe,
27
 were 
by far not as convincing as “A Free Man’s Worship” or “The Essence of Religion” were; they 
simply lacked the depth of these two pieces. Apparently, Russell produced good philosophy of 
humanistic religion only when he worked in parallel on prime themes of his technical philoso-
phy. Perhaps this explains why Russell’s writings on religion can easily be divided into two 
parts: while those written until 1920—i.e. when he was most creative in philosophy—were sym-
pathetic to religion, those written after 1920 were sharply critical of it.
28
  
 
The Early Russell on the Religion of the Free Man  
 As already noted, Russell’s first attempt to elaborate on his religion without dogma and God 
was made in his essay “A Free Man’s Worship”. The main subject of this essay, and that of the 
unfinished and unpublished manuscript of the same period, “The Pilgrimage of Life,” was “the 
inexhaustible mystery of existence, in which, as by some strange marriage of pain, the sufferer is 
bound to the world by bonds of sorrow”.29 This mystery rises from the tragic place man has in 
cosmos: 
 
That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that 
his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of ac-
cidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, 
can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devo-
tion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction 
in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement must 
inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe of ruins—all these things, if not quite 
beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can stand.
30
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Russell was conscious that this mystery cannot be resolved in quasi-scientific terms. He was crit-
ical of the “religion of reason” as advanced by some French philosophers of the Enlightenment, 
as well as by Hegel and his acolytes.
31
 In fact, on this point, Russell “would have argued readily 
with Tertullian and Kierkegaard that religion concerns the absurd rather than that it discloses a 
rational structure to the universe”.32 Russell realized this all of a sudden, on February 10, 1901, 
when he was 28 years old, in a moment of illumination: 
 
Suddenly the ground seemed to give way beneath me, and I found myself in quite another re-
gion. Within five minutes I went through some such reflections as the following: the loneli-
ness of the human soul is unendurable; nothing can penetrate it except the highest intensity of 
the sort of love that religious teachers have preached; whatever does not spring from this mo-
tive is harmful, or at least useless.
33
  
 
This insight remained firm in Russell’s mind, also determining his conversion to a pacifist out-
look that found expression in his fight against the Great War and in his remarkable career as an 
anti-war political activist later. 
 Russell’s main thought in “The Free Man’s Worship” was that the free man can challenge the 
hostility of the universe with brave action—both cognitive, and practical. The free man, as all 
other people, is powerless in this inhuman world. But he has ideals “in the realm of imagination, 
in music, in architecture, in the untroubled kingdom of reason”,34 which work against it. We find 
a brief presentation of these ideals in “The Education of Emotions” (1902): “A broad, free, ad-
venturous spirit, a spirit of bold hope, of reckless daring, a spirit swept by a breath as uncontrol-
lable as the Atlantic winds—this is what makes the splendid achievements of the world, and 
sways the sluggard mass of humanity as the breeze sways the ripening corn.”35 The faith based 
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on such ideals communicates the energy that helps the free man to decisively descend into the 
world of facts and try to change it. The ideal is a kind of vision, of “unfettered contemplation.” 
This attitude toward the hostility of the universe is part and parcel of the free man’s life—he en-
counters the inconveniences of the future with its help. It is a way to contemplate the Fate.
36
  
 Following the direction given by Christianity, Russell also praised the resignation—of desires, 
not of thoughts, though. Our thoughts have to be most active. The emancipated man is “free, 
during his brief years, to examine, to exercise, to know, and in imagination to create.”37  
 In contrast to the free man, the ordinary man’s answer to the mystery of existence is to create 
a God, which is nothing but the mystic unity of what is and what should be. This religion has as 
its philosophical counterpart the metaphysics based on mysticism, not on logic. Russell opposed 
it with a kind of religious humanism: the objects of the free man’s worships are created by the 
free human mind. 
 
Method Change  
 Russell’s 1911–12 philosophy of religion without God and dogma, which will occupy us in 
the present paper, was developed in a period of his philosophical development in which he is be-
lieved to have discovered a new, scientific philosophical method he called “philosophical analy-
sis.” Russell was convinced that it is the true method in philosophy which has enormous heuristic 
power. He projected it as the kernel of a new type of philosophy he called “analytic philosophy.”  
 Armed with this new method, Russell took the courage to return to his old subject, the free 
man’s worship. Now, however, he tried to elaborate a theory of religious humanism which he ar-
ticulated in a paper, with arguments and reference to evidence. (“The Free Man’s Worship” was 
only an essay.) The objective of this theory was to analyze religious beliefs. At the same time, and 
we will show that below, the tenor of his two projects for religion without God and dogma, that of 
1903, and that of 1911–12, remained the same: both tried to outline a religion without God and 
dogma. 
                                                 
36
 Bertrand Russell, “A Free Man’s Worship,” 46. 
37
 Bertrand Russell, “A Free Man’s Worship,” 41. This point of Russell was echoed in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks on 
August 13, 1916:  
 “How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this world? 
 Through the life of knowledge.” (Ludwig Wittgenstein Notebooks 1914–1916, 81) 
10 
 
 Theoretically, Russell’s second project was developed in the context of his philosophical dis-
cussion of two terms: universals and matter. This is clearly seen in the manuscript of “Prisons” in 
which the problem of universals and the discussion of matter loomed large. In fact, these topics 
became prominent in Russell’s philosophy only after the introduction of the concept of sense-data 
in it in the summer of 1911, while he was writing The Problems of Philosophy.
38
  
In that book, Russell adopted the view that we do not directly perceive physical objects; we 
perceive only sense-data and universals (the latter are qualities and relations, including qualities 
and relations of sense-data). We can know physical objects only by inference. We know them 
since, from the sense-data and the universals we are acquainted with, we can logically infer that 
there are physical objects. 
In “On Matter,” however, Russell abandoned the view that we infer matter from sense-data 
and universals. Instead, he started to consider matter as a logical construction out of them. The 
underlying idea of this new epistemology was to conceive the world as ultimately consisting of 
independent atomic units (later called “logical atoms”)—sense-data and universals. These primi-
tive elements can be ordered in different, logically organized nets in which sense-data and uni-
versals are interrelated. The objects of common sense can be seen as the constructions of some of 
these atoms, while the objects of the hypotheses of science are alternative constructions of these 
and of other atoms. 
 Significantly, this new conception of matter had important world-view consequences. Russell 
designed his new conception of matter as “a model of cold passionate analysis, setting forth the 
most painful conclusions with utter disregard of human feelings. ... There is nothing to compare 
to passion for giving one cold insight”.39 Russell was glad that he would “shock the people” with 
this new theory,
40
 as long as it made them see the world without here, without now, and also 
without me. 
  
Contemplation and Action 
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 Russell’s 191112 philosophy of religion followed the ancient and medieval tradition of 
adopting two possible attitudes toward the world—contemplation and action. 
 (i) The action-attitude aims at producing some change in the world. To shape the world, it 
divides it into two opposites: good, and bad. Here are some of the characteristics of the acting 
soul: it strives for power and possession; it is limited to bounded spaces: monads, modules; its 
projects are realized in private, not in universal, perspectives.  
(ii) Things are altogether different with the contemplative attitude toward the world. It com-
prehends the world in a universal perspective. Thus, it enlarges the soul to the rooms of the uni-
verse. In such a state, “the soul becomes free from the bonds of friend and foe, a citizen of the 
universe and not only one walled City at war with all the rest”.41 Russell did not insist that the 
division between the action-attitude and the contemplative attitude is absolute. In fact, it is only a 
matter of degree. The question is which attitude toward the world prevails. In fact, one attitude 
cannot oust the opposite one completely. Freedom, for example, is only a goal towards which we 
can approach; we cannot achieve complete freedom. On the same note, there is no exclusive con-
templation—at some point, the contemplation leaves room for action. 
 Although the free man mostly contemplates, he is also engaged in action—but only in an ac-
tion that is filtered (controlled) by contemplation. The free man’s action is “impregnated with 
contemplation”.42 His world of action is “tamed” through training in contemplative vision; his 
strivings and desires are not, thus, insistent as the desires of the man who is not free. 
 As already mentioned, this project ran parallel to Russell’s program for the new philosophy he 
called “analytic.” Two years after he wrote the words just cited from “Prisons,” Russell stated 
that he defended an “analytic philosophy” that uses “the harmonizing mediation of reason, which 
tests our beliefs by their mutual compatibility, and examines, in doubtful cases, the possible 
sources of error on the one side and on the other”.43 This is a philosophy of “the scientific re-
straint and balance”.44 It, so to speak, permeates speculative philosophy with reason.45 Converse-
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ly, the old philosophy (philosophia perennis) produces theories and ideas that are not examined 
in this way. In other words, the old (also “speculative”) philosophy tries to achieve in the realm 
of theoretical philosophy what dogmas try to achieve in religion. Its endeavor is to reveal the 
unique truth that is valid forever and for everyone. Russell was convinced that this approach was 
abortive.  
 Furthermore, in his technical philosophy, he set out that whereas the old logic advanced can-
ons or logical forms that are restrictive—researchers are to follow them, the new logic suggests 
only possible hypotheses that help our imagination, thus, freeing us from the fetters of the logical 
prejudices.
46
 Similarly, in “The Essence of Religion,” Russell maintained that “the divine part of 
man
47
 does not demand that the world shall conform to a pattern [to a dogma]: it accepts the 
world [as it is], and finds in wisdom a union which demands nothing of the world”.48  
 But let us return to our exploration of Russell’s religious dilemma: contemplation, and/or ac-
tion. The contemplative attitude was seen by Russell in two different plains again: (i) In cogni-
tive plain, as “the vision of all the ages of the earth, the depths of space, and the hierarchy of the 
eternal truths, met and mirrored in one mind”.49 (ii) On an emotional plain, as a combination of 
joy and sorrow. On the one side, what this type of  
 
vision seems to show … is that we can live in a deeper region than the region of little every-
day cares and desires—where beauty is a revelation of something beyond, where it becomes 
possible to love all men, where Self as a separate fighting unit fades away, and where all 
common tasks are easy because they are seen as parts of what is greatest. ... 
Yet [we] have another vision, equally insistent, equally seeming like a revelation; in this 
vision, sorrow is the ultimate truth of life, everything else is oblivion or delusion.
50
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In such moments we feel “a nameless infinite sadness”.51 The desire for suicide rises, and is a 
question of instinct, not of theory, nor even art or contemplation, would we survive it. 
 
Infinity 
 Russell’s analysis of contemplation led him to explore the personal infinite. According to him, 
the structure of the personal infinite parallels the structure of the concept of infinite in mathemat-
ics.
52
 This is clearly expressed in some of Russell’s letters from 1912, in which he confessed:  
 
I simply can’t stand a view limited to this earth. I feel life so small unless it has windows into 
other worlds. ... I like mathematics largely because it is not human and has nothing particular 
to do with this planet or with the whole accidental universe—because, like Spinoza’s God, it 
won’t love us in return.53  
 
 In “The Perplexities of John Forstice,” Russell maintained that “the same attitude which the 
mathematician adopts towards the abstract world is possible also towards the world of exist-
ence”.54 In fact, it was exactly this attitude—supported by such powerful emotions—that urged 
Russell (perhaps unconsciously) to adopt unusually uncritical (for his own standard of exactness) 
account of infinity in mathematics between 1898 and 1919.
55
 
 In a letter to Ottoline Morrell from November 18, 1911, Russell wrote: 
 
What you call God is very much what I call infinity. I do feel something in common in all the 
great things— ... it is very mysterious and I really don’t know what to think of it—but I feel it 
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is the most important thing in the world and really the one thing that matters profoundly. It is 
to me as yet a mystery—I don’t understand it. I think it has many manifestations.56  
 
But they are chiefly two, namely, love and truth.  
 In other places, Russell defined infinity in rather psychological terms: “It is the escape from 
prison that gives to some moments and some thoughts a quality of infinity”.57 The latter pro-
motes an insight deeper than the piecemeal knowledge of our daily life. To achieve such infinity, 
“it is necessary to abstain from any demand that the world shall conform to our standards”.58 In 
other words, we must strive to eliminate the instinct in us, in particular, in our will—or at least, 
to minimize its role, and to embrace the infinite; we should do that since the instinct leads us to 
the prison of the finite. Importantly enough, we must curb our instinct with the help of reason. 
Indeed, the reason is infinite; the insight is finite. 
 
Union with the Universe 
 As I have just pointed out, Russell’s new humanistic religion was formulated in optical 
items,
59
 as a contemplation of the universe. The main thesis of “Prisons” was that we must evade 
a life in one perspective, in one monad. Instead, we should strive to reach an access to many per-
spectives from which we can contemplate the world more fully. To stay in one perspective 
means to stay in a “prison.”60 
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 Russell explained the prison-building with the dominance of self-interest and subjectivity. It is 
a prison “because [it] shuts out the love, the knowledge, and the attainment of goods otherwise 
possible”.61 Against this kind of “spiritual incarceration,” Russell outlined a program for a new 
religion which presents a “union with the universe achieved by subordination of the demands of 
the Self”:62 not a union of omnipotence, however, but of impersonal contemplative vision. It cir-
cumscribes all acts of will. Only such a union can ease our existential pain. It is to be achieved 
by embracing not our personal perspective (that of our private monad) but by opening an access 
to all possible perspectives. Only such a religious attitude can bring us to the infinity. 
 Russell’s conclusion was: “It is therefore important to preserve religion”,63 but in a new form. 
In the old age, it was the love to God that secured this unity; nowadays, with our beliefs faded 
away, our outlook became finite. The important point is that this mode of union with the universe 
“asks nothing [no rewards] of the world [and of God], and depends solely upon ourselves”.64  
 It should be kept in mind that in his epistemology, as developed in Our Knowledge of the Ex-
ternal World, Russell advanced a theory of perception according to which the world is full of 
infinite perspectives or aspects. The perspectives are objective (they are real), and also mutually 
related. They can be perceived, or can remain unperceived. The perceived perspectives are pri-
vate. A common-sense object, at this particular moment, can be seen as a system of aspects. Sim-
ilarly, a physical object can be seen as logical constructions of aspects. Every aspect of an object 
is a member of two different classes of aspects: (i) the various aspects of the object; (ii) the per-
spective of which the given aspect is a member. The physicist classifies the aspects in the first 
way, the psychologist in the second.  
                                                 
61
 Bertrand Russell, “Prisons,” 102. 
62
 Bertrand Russell, “Prisons,” 1911, 105. Russell adopted the concept of “union with the universe” from Spinoza 
(see Kenneth Blackwell, The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell, vii). To be sure, Spinoza was the first Western 
philosopher to speak in these terms. Russell gained affinity to Spinoza’s philosophy of religion by his study of Fred-
erick Pollock’s book on Spinoza (Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy, London: Kegan Paul, 1880). 
Also, around 1894, when Russell considered himself a neo-Hegelian, he found the ontological argument sound (cf. 
Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1
st
 vol., 60). In the philosophical tradition, this problem is 
known as that of ecstasy. See for it (Pseudo-) Dionysius Areopagita, Divinorum nominorum, iv, 13. 
63
 Bertrand Russell, “Prisons,” 104. 
64
 Bertrand Russell, “Prisons,” 105. 
16 
 
 As I have already mentioned, this position was first developed in Russell’s paper “On Mat-
ter,” which he wrote in parallel to “The Essence of Religion.” And as we have just seen, in “The 
Essence of Religion,” he tried to demonstrate that in the same way in which there are no physical 
objects, we do not need to worship God. It is easy to see here that Russell applied the same pro-
cedure of decomposition analysis both in his technical philosophy and in his philosophy of reli-
gion.  
 Russell’s conclusion is that it is “in union with the world [that] the soul finds its freedom”.65 
People strive eagerly for religious illumination, or for spiritual ecstasy, with the hope to achieve 
such a union. The problem, however, is how this union with the world, or the universe, is to be 
realized: on the basis of the conventional theistic religion, or otherwise. Russell is convinced that 
traditional religion fails to destroy the prisons of the finite: it sticks to dogmas. 
 To suggest a better way of satisfying human cravings for freedom, Russell found out that 
there are three types of free union with the universe. These are actualized in three alternative 
realms in which this striving is experienced: (i) the union of thought;
66
 (ii) the union of feeling, 
or desire; and (iii) the union of will. Their products are, respectively, (i) knowledge, (ii) love, and 
(iii) service.
67
  
 What promotes a real union with the universe is the combination of these three, which can 
also be called “wisdom.” “The life of wisdom seeks an impartial end, in which there is no rival-
ry, no essential enmity. The union which it seeks has no boundaries: it wishes to know all, to 
love all, and to serve all”.68 Importantly enough, Russell defended rationalism and intellect also 
in the realm of religion since without them one cannot achieve impartiality of contemplation. He 
pleaded for “rational contemplation”—this exactly is the contemplation of the free man. The 
latter acts “dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge. [It] will value more 
the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter”.69  
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Education of Emotions
70
  
 As already seen, the main characteristic of Russell’s humanistic religion is the impartiality of 
vision: “The infinite part of our life does not see the world from one point of view: it shines im-
partially, like the diffused light on a cloudy sea”.71 This impartiality leads to truth in thought, 
justice in action, and universal love in feeling. At the other extreme is the finite part of our life. 
For it, it is typical to have “the hatred of enemies and the love of allies in battle.72 ... [It] view[s] 
the universe as grouped about one point”.73  
 What is necessary in order to achieve an impartiality of vision is a certain emotional effort to 
eliminate our “attachment to the concrete facts,” our “cognitive egoism”; something like a skep-
sis to arrive at a kind of stoic ataraxia.
74
 But we can achieve a spiritual ataraxia only if we “no 
longer ask of life that it shall yield [us] any of those personal goods that are subject to the muta-
tions of Time”.75 Only then can we receive a “new vision,” consisting of the contemplation of 
Fate, which is to bring us to “the very gate of wisdom”.76 With that vision always in our mental 
eye, we can then descend into action.  
 Russell underlined that in our unexamined lives, we endeavor to impose ourselves upon the 
world. This is expressed in “Prisons” in this way: “The soul instinctively views the world as ma-
terial for its own greatness”.77 This instinct is based on “the Will [which] is the very essence of 
the Self, the energy by which the Self lives, the self-assertion by which it secures its place in the 
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universe”.78 It is because of this that the Self is “less capable than the intellect of complete free-
dom and complete union with the world”.79 
 Ultimately, Russell’s objective was the cultivation of a “free intellect.” Such an intellect  
 
will see as God might see, without here and now, without hopes and fears, without the tram-
mels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and 
exclusive desire of knowledge—knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is 
possible for man to attain.
80
  
 
This is, incidentally, what Russell’s epistemology also strove for. 
 For its achievement, philosophical training is of special importance. Russell was convinced 
that “[t]he mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic 
contemplation will preserve something of the same freedom and impartiality in the world of ac-
tion and emotion”.81 The ultimate upshot of the philosophical training in this realm is the suspen-
sion of the will:  
 
The transition from the life of the finite self to the infinite life in the whole requires a moment 
of absolute self-surrender, when all personal will seems to cease, and the soul feels itself in 
passive submission to the universe. [ … This is] a state of suspension of the will, when the 
soul no longer seeks to impose itself upon the world, but is open to every impression that 
comes to it from the world (italics added).
82
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As we have noted at the beginning of this paper, Wittgenstein suggested a similar solution—
eliminating the willing subject from his ontology of person. It neither lies on the plane of ideas, 
nor on its outer boundary. We just see its effects on the plane of ideas or on its boundary. 
 
 Religion beyond God and Mysticism 
 At the end of “The Essence of Religion,” Russell produced a final philosophical analysis of 
religious beliefs. He decided to follow at that the scheme outlined by the Christian religion that 
served him as the guidance but filled its chapters with a new content. Little wonder then that, on 
the model of Christianity, Russell’s humanistic religion has three chapters: worship, acquies-
cence, and love. 
 (a) Worship. Religious worship can be either selective, or impartial. Selective worship is di-
rected either to individuals (whom we call “celebrities” today), or to deeds of excellence, or to 
God. When the objects of contemplation are individuals, or great deeds, they sooner or later get 
discarded (the worship for them fades away), and this is simply because they also have sides that 
are not perfect. The only solid object of selective contemplation is God. The theism, or the belief 
in God, however, is dogmatic out of necessity, with all the problems of religious dogmatism I 
have discussed so far. Another problem with this kind of selective worship is that it “finds its full 
object only in the ideal good which creative contemplation imagines”.83 It, thus, makes impossi-
ble the union with the actual world. Its advantage is that it satisfies our hunger for perfection.  
 The alternative to selective worship is impartial worship: “Such a worship is given by the con-
templative vision, which finds mystery and joy in all that [really] exists, and brings with it love 
to all that has life”.84 Since it is a direct attitude, it does not involve a judgment about what is 
good among the existing things and, so, cannot be right or wrong. Besides, it does not require 
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belief in God, and so, does not embrace a dogma. Hence, it is “not assailable by the arguments 
which have destroyed the tenets of traditional religion”.85  
 A problem with selective worship is that its object is the ideal good. The latter, however, be-
longs to the world of universals. Practical men have little interest in it, though, since the univer-
sals do not exist in the actual world. In contrast, the objects of the impartial worship do exist; 
however, they are not perfectly good. So, this kind of worship is wrong when it assumes that the 
universe is good. And this is a problem since an essential part of the worship is to wish that it 
may be as good as possible.  
 Russell’s conclusion is that the two kinds of worships, selective and impartial, have to be 
practiced complimentary: “one [involves] the goodness but not the existence of its objects, the 
other [involves] the existence but not the goodness of its objects”.86 From this position, Russell 
entails the necessity for religious action as “a continual endeavor to bridge the gulf between the 
objects of these two worships, by making more good exist and more of the existence good”.87  
(b) Acquiescence. We have seen that Russell suggested the stoic ataraxia as a means to face 
the evil of the universe already in 1902–3. The religious attitude can help us develop in ourselves 
self-effacement with respect to the external world. In “The Essence of Religion,” Russell opened 
a special chapter in his project for religion without dogma which deals with the hardship of Fate: 
acquiescence. Acquiescence helps to achieve a “moral discipline.” It, too, is not a judgment 
about the events in the world (so that it cannot be right or wrong) but is an adopted attitude that 
can help us to free ourselves from fighting lost battles, to cope with the challenges of the Fate. 
There are two kinds of acquiescence. The first one helps us diminish our private grief; the 
second one faces the fundamental Evil on Earth. Russell recommends acquiescence, in particu-
lar, with regard to private grief. “It comes in the moment of submission which brings about the 
birth of the impartial will. … By submission our thoughts are freed, and our will is led to new 
aims”.88 Such submission helps us to realize our boundaries and concentrate energy and creativi-
ty on objects that are under our control. Indignation toward the universe, which is of utmost im-
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portance for all dogmatic religions, is pointless as well. In fact, “the realization of necessity is the 
liberation from indignation”.89 We must not engage in abortive fights.  
It is also important to notice that the two kinds of acquiescence are supported by the impar-
tiality of contemplation. This means that acquiescence “is at once a cause and an effect of 
faith”.90  
(c) Love. Love, too, is of two kinds: divine,
91
 or heavenly love, and earthly love. The former is 
impartial; the latter is selective. The earthly love is, in principle, opposed to hatred. It polarizes 
the world in principle: we love our friends and hate our foes; one loves God and hates the Devil. 
In contrast, divine love “can be given to everything that has life”.92 It is contemplative, but 
whenever action is possible, it motivates one to act. 
 Divine love is accessible only to the “universal soul.” One can present it this way: While the 
contemplation relates to the intellect of the universal soul, divine love relates to its emotions. The 
latter helps us destroy the private prison of selective love. It supports the service to other people, 
to our community, and to humanity, in general. It makes service an enjoyable experience and 
helps us escape the disgrace of loneliness. 
 Since the love of man is connected to service, it is much more active than divine love, which 
is thoroughly contemplative. However, it is helpful if the love of man is supported by the non-
theistic worship of the ideal good which gives it guidance. “The worship of good is indeed the 
greater of the two commandments, since it leads us to know that love of man is good”.93  
 In conclusion, Russell underlines that “the three elements of religion, namely worship, acqui-
escence, and love, are intimately connected; each helps to produce the others, and all three to-
gether form a unity in which it is impossible to say which comes first, which last”.94  
 
Why Russell’s Project for a new Religion without God and Dogma Failed 
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 My analysis of Russell’s religious writings between 1902 and 1912 shows that, as a philoso-
pher, he was not interested only in securing certain knowledge. Russell also hoped that his new 
method in philosophy, the method of analysis, could help achieve a new form of religious conso-
lation. Moreover, we have seen that Russell’s best pieces on religious consolation were written in 
parallel to his most abstract and also most influential works in technical philosophy. This indi-
cates that technical philosophy can stimulate fruitful religious discussions. Even more important-
ly, it can help stir up reflections on religion that otherwise remain closed. 
 Russell’s project to outline a theory of religious consolation failed for two reasons. First, he 
lacked the physical and, apparently, also the psychological vigor to complete it. Russell himself 
made this point. As he noted in his letters, the work on the short essay “A Free Man’s Worship” 
was the “result of much suffering”.95 It was written very slowly—something quite unusual for 
him. Russell must read “enormously to make up”.96 After the collapse of the “Prison” project, 
late in 1912, Russell noted: “It was perhaps too soon to write so ambitious a book”.97 He needed 
much more time to present it in a proper form.  
 Much more significant for the failure of the project, however, was Wittgenstein’s criticism of 
it. In a letter written shortly after “The Essence of Religion” was published, Russell noted: Witt-
genstein “is frightfully pained by my […] article which he evidently detests.”98 In particular, 
Wittgenstein insisted “that such things are too intimate for print.”99 Importantly enough, Russell 
cared about Wittgenstein’s arguments “very much, because [he] half agree[d] with him.”100 Es-
pecially, he wondered whether the terms he used in his paper were appropriate. Perhaps, instead 
of “worship,” he should speak of “reverence”—wrote Russell in the same letter.  
 To sum up things, Wittgenstein’s criticism was the main reason for Russell to abandon the 
project of the philosophical analysis of religious beliefs forever. In an interview he gave in 1963, 
at the age of 91, he told a reporter that “The Essence of Religion” “soon came to seem to me too 
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religious, and I never reprinted it”.101 This, however, is a pity since, as the reconstruction of Rus-
sell’s view on this subject has shown, the project was really promising. 
 Eventually, Russell’s negative stance toward the philosophical analysis of religion found ex-
pression in his famous pamphlet Why I am not a Christian, which is considered today as Rus-
sell’s official view about “the essence of religion.” In that pamphlet, Russell continued to criti-
cize religious dogmas and also to argue against God, in particular, against Jesus Christ. At the 
same time, however, he refused to suggest any positive views about a religion without dogma 
and God. Now he considered this project a non-starter. 
 It should also be observed that shortly after his devastating criticism of Russell’s paper on 
religious consolation, Wittgenstein decided to explore the same subject—human religious be-
liefs—but following all the rules of exact philosophy as he understood it. (We have already spo-
ken about this project at the beginning of the paper.) Importantly enough, in the process of re-
flecting on this subject, which Russell first explored, Wittgenstein became deeply engaged with 
it in practice. Here is the impression Russell gained from Wittgenstein when they met for the 
first time after the Great War in December 1919: “I had found in his book [the Tractatus] a fla-
vor of mysticism, but was astonished when I found that he has become a complete mystic. He 
reads people like Kierkegaard and Angelus Silesius, he seriously contemplates becoming a 
monk”.102  
 One can see the destructive role of Wittgenstein on Russell’s efforts to apply his new method 
of analysis to religious belief as the first case of a tendency in their joint work in philosophy
103
 
which reached its culmination some months later. In May and June 1913, Wittgenstein radically 
criticized Russell’s manuscript of the Theory of Knowledge.104 The critique was so devastating 
that Russell lost his motivation to practice philosophy for years. He managed to restart his philo-
sophical explorations only after the Great War, but in a new form. In the 1920s, he tried to apply 
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his method of philosophical analysis to psychology and physics, as they developed after the 
newest scientific discoveries of the time.
105
 Unfortunately, this period of Russell’s philosophical 
development was not as fruitful as the preceding one. Even more unfortunate, however, was that 
Russell never again had the courage to positively discuss “the essence of religion.”106  
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